Tag Archives: militarisation

Campus Police as ‘Full Law Enforcement’: Widening the Jurisdiction

The previous two blogs have discussed the issue of policing in the form of SROs in K-12 schooling and external law enforcement agencies; this post will now turn to look at the transformation of law enforcement in colleges and universities across the United States. Similar to the alterations which took place at K-12 schools after the Columbine shooting (refer to the previous two blogs for more details), the impetus for change at further and higher education institutes occurred after the tragic incident at Virginia Tech University in 2007.
To begin with, an investigation carried out at the request of the President into the circumstances around the Virginia Tech shooting found that there were a number of limitations with the current status of law enforcement. (1) It was found that campus police felt that they were not considered to be ‘full law enforcement’ by students, campus officials and officers from external law enforcement departments. The ‘legitimacy’ of police is of key important in convincing people to trust their decisions and follow their orders. (2) Concurrently, the report ordered by the Governor of Virginia, recommended that the mission statements of campus police should give precedence to their role as crime prevention officials. (3) This was subsequently translated into policy at Virginia Tech University, where the jurisdiction of the campus police department was expanded to give it the same authority as law enforcement agencies to do the following activities: make arrests, conduct investigations, enact security procedures, enforce laws and approve building modifications. Additionally, the police and rescue departments have been amalgamated into one facility, hence cementing the legitimacy of their position. (4) Rationalising and redefining the roles of police to deal with crime relates to the ‘culture of crime control,’ where government agencies alone — in this case, educational institutions — are not trusted to manage the risk. (5)
On another note, the report prepared at the request of the president noted that many campus police departments are under-staffed and lack critical resources. (6) At Virginia Tech University, funds of $487, 400 were appropriated by its executive vice president to employ eleven new members of staff in the campus police department. The police department currently has forty-nine officers, ten dispatchers, eight security guards and five support personnel. Equipment was also procured by the university: marked cars to increase visibility of police; uniforms for security guards; rifles for patrol officers. (7) Once again, this brings to mind the idea of ‘militarism’ within law enforcement, where the weaponry of the military is utilised as a problem-solving tool. (8) Overall, these actions are tangible indicators of the institution ‘doing something,’ further strengthening the legitimacy of campus police in their role of managing school shootings and other threats faced.

[This blog was formed using analyses of federal and state policy documents published in the aftermath of the Virginia Tech shooting, alongside relevant academic readings. It wraps up the theme of law enforcement changes following school shootings that have been the focus of the last few blog posts.]

(1) Leavitt, M. O., A. R. Gonzales, and M. Spelling. (2007) ‘Report to the President on Issues Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy.’ 13 June, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.
(2) Tyler, T. R. (2011) ‘Trust and legitimacy: Policing in the USA and Europe.’ European Journal of Criminology 8(4), 254-266.
(3) Virginia Tech Review Panel. (2009) ‘Mass shootings at Virginia Tech April 16, 2007: Report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel presented to Timothy M. Kaine, Governor, Commonwealth of Virginia (updated edition).’ November. http://www.vtreviewpanel.org/report/index.html.
(4) Internal policy documents ‘University Safety and Security’ and ‘Crisis and Emergency Management Plan,’ both published throughout 2012.
(5) Garland, D. (2001) The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
(6) Leavitt, M. O., A. R. Gonzales, and M. Spelling. (2007) ‘Report to the President on Issues Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy.’ 13 June, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.
(7) Internal policy documents ‘University Safety and Security’ and ‘Crisis and Emergency Management Plan,’ both published throughout 2012.
(8) Kraska, P. B. (2007) ‘Militarization and Policing – Its Relevance to 21st Century Police.’ Policing 1(4), 501-513.

“In law enforcement, we cannot have a cookie cutter solution”: Post-Columbine Changes to Law Enforcement Tactics

The quote in the title is indicative of the stance law enforcement has now adopted in a post-Columbine context. The statement was made by Sergeant AJ DeAndrea (Arvada Police Department), a SWAT member involved in Columbine and two other school shooting incidents in Colorado. (1) This blog will discuss the ways in which law enforcement changed its rescue priorities and training techniques to deal with school shootings following the Columbine incident. It could be said that these represent the ‘militarisation’ of police forces, where they adopt the cultural (values, styles) and organisational (tactics) aspects of the military. (2)

A noticeable element of the Columbine shooting was the criticism it provoked of law enforcement response. The law enforcement officers stationed outside Columbine went through the lengthy process of ‘securing the perimeter’ to stop the perpetrators escaping and of escorting students out after searching each one for weapons. Issues contended in the public sphere more generally were whether: teacher, William ‘Dave’ Sanders, who was shot in the chest and survived for four hours afterwards, could have been saved had medical teams been ‘allowed’ to enter the school; and a more expeditious law enforcement response could have prevented the bulk of the carnage, which took place in the library and resulted in the deaths of ten students. (3)

On the contrary, a report by Jefferson County provided a justification of sorts for the delayed response at Columbine. The SWAT officers had to form an ‘ad hoc’ team of police from different agencies with no previous contact. Other difficulties facing the teams were: incorrect Intel being provided, such as there being snipers, hostages and up to eight gunmen in the building; out-dated information about the building layout; most officers did not have their tactical equipment with them. Additionally, inside the school, officers faced hazardous conditions of flashing strobe lights, overflowing sprinklers, and fire alarms wailing. (4)

Since the confusion about building layout was something that hindered police response to Columbine, law enforcement tactical operations are now driven by knowledge about the environment in which a crisis is occurring, according to Sergeant DeAndrea. A useful technique in preparing law enforcers for potential school shooting attacks could be ‘tactical architecture,’ predicated on interpreting public spaces and their links to behaviour, an approach intended to aid operational policing. (5) Relating this to schools, it could allow law enforcers to instruct staff and students of ways to optimise survival if a shooting were to take place by highlighting escape points and places to hide.

Secondly, Sergeant DeAndrea explained that law enforcement training since Columbine has been honed into a single response led by SROs (see previous blog post for more details of their role in emergency management and response). Further to this, during an active shooter or hostage situation, the law enforcement rescue priorities have now changed to ‘hostages, civilians, cop, suspect.’ Sergeant AJ DeAndrea went on to clarify that hostages being held against their will on the threat of violence and civilians in an active shooter situation are the priorities for rescuing; the lives of cops comes below this and the life of the suspect is the least important factor, since the most important aspect of response is rescuing those in harm’s way.

[The blog post was put together using statements made during Sergeant DeAndrade’s presentation at the ‘School Safety Symposium’ in 2013, further reading around the response to Columbine and scholarly discussions of law enforcement training. The next post will look at the differences to campus police at colleges and universities in the United States following school shootings.]

  • Statements from Sergeant DeAndrade were made during a presentation at the ‘School Safety Symposium’ held at Columbine High School in June 2013, organised by I Love U Guys.
  • For further information, see: Kraska, P. B. (2007) ‘Militarization and Policing – Its Relevance to 21st Century Police.’ Policing 1(4), 501-513.
  • These were criticisms often made in news media reports and letters to the editor. An extensive sample of these were analysed by the author as part of a separate research project.
  • Jefferson County Sheriff reports examined SWAT techniques, equipment and the critical incident reponse overall on the day of the shooting. See http://extras.denverpost.com/news/colreport/columbinerep/pages for more information.
  • Jonescu, E. ‘Strategic and Tactical Architecture: An Instrument of Law Enforcement.’ In Bouttell, L. and S. Doran. Reframing Punishment: Silencing, Dehumanisation and the Way Forward. Oxford: Inter-Disciplinary, page numbers needed.